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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030902CA

v.
ROBERT HAL OLSEN, JR.
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third
degree felony (R. 1-2).

This court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing
defendant to the statutory prison term on a third degree felony
conviction?
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial
court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally
prescribed limits.

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah

1989)(citations omitted).

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that

"[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."

State

v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App. 417, 16, 82 P.3d 211 (quoting State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah -1978)(quotations omitted;
alternations in original)) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, governing indeterminite terms of
imprisonment for felony convictions, states:
A person who has been convicted of a felony
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as follows:

(3) In the case of a felony of the third
degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five
years.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 {2002).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged with one count of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony (R. 1-2).

The

charge was later amended to possession of a controlled substance,
a third degree felony (Id.).

Defendant entered a no contest plea

to the reduced charge (R. 19-24).

The court decreased

defendant's bail from $10,000 to $5000 and referred defendant to
Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence investigation report
-2-

(R. 16, 19-24).

Defendant subsequently failed to appear for

sentencing, and the court issued a no bail arrest warrant (R. 26,
30).

Two weeks later, defendant appeared in court and was

sentenced to zero to five years in prison, with credit for time
served (R. 31-32).

This timely appeal followed (R. 34).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Because defendant waived his preliminary hearing and the
case did not go to trial, the record facts are necessarily
limited.

The responding officer provided the following factual

account in his probable cause affidavit:
Called to a D[omestic] V[iolence] in progress
at 29th and Jefferson. Suspect reported to
be leaving east on 29th. Noticed [defendant]
walking fast at 29th & Jackson. Asked him to
stop and asked him his name. He ran and
threw a quarter ounce of methamphetamine and
had individual baggies consistent w/selling.
R. 9.

At the plea hearing, the State provided the following

undisputed factual basis for defendant's no contest plea:
The police were called to a domestic
• ' ' '
disturbance. When they got there, the
defendant was leaving the scene. And they
tried to stop him to talk to him about what
happened, and he ran and threw something that
they retrieved and discovered [it] was a
quarter ounce of methamphetamine.
R. 43 at 5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the sentencing court abused its
discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant sentencing
factors and, consequently, imposing an excessive sentence.

-3-

For

this argument, defendant relies on State v. Gallic 967 P.2d 930
(Utah 1998).
Defendant's reliance is misplaced.

Galli is a consecutive

sentencing case, governed by the statute regulating imposition of
consecutive sentences.
single sentence.

This case involves a single charge and a

Galli does not apply.

The court here sentenced defendant within the statutory
limits for the crime to which he entered his plea.

Moreover,

even considering the factors defendant highlights, the court
still retained the discretion to send him to prison rather than
order probation.

A trial court has no obligation to favor

rehabilitation over punishment.

Where the trial court followed

the law, it cannot be said that u no reasonable [person] would
take the view adopted by the trial court."
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

State v. Gerrard, 584

Consequently, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY SENTENCING HIM TO THE
STATUTORY SENTENCE ON A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to consider "all the legally relevant factors" and,
consequently, by imposing an "excessive sentence" of zero to five
years in prison on a third degree felony conviction.
Aplt. at 11.

Br. of

Specifically, defendant contends that the trial

-4-

court did not consider either his rehabilitative needs or his
criminal history.

See id. at 12-13.

According to defendant, had

the trial court properly weighed these factors, it would not have
sentenced him to prison.

Id. at 15.

For this proposition,

defendant relies wholly on State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998) .
Defendant's argument fails because he is applying the wrong
law to the facts of his case.

State v. Galli is a consecutive

sentencing case, governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401.

In that

case, the supreme court reversed the trial court's imposition of
consecutive sentences because the court did not properly consider
certain statutory factors before imposing consecutive sentences.
Id. at 938-39.
sentencing.

This case, however, does not involve consecutive

Defendant here was convicted of a single felony and

received a single sentence.

The law applicable to consecutive

sentencing does not apply to this case.
Defendant's case is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203,
governing indeterminite terms of imprisonment for felony
convictions.

It provides:

A person who has been convicted of a felony
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as follows:

(3) In the case of a felony of the third
degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five
years.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.
-5-

Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory
term for a third degree felony.

Such a sentence, on its face,

does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

See Gerrard, 584

P.2d at 887-88.
Moreover, defendant has not included the presentence
investigation-report as part of the record on appeal.

See Utah

R. Criiti. P. 21.5(b) (burdening defendant with responsibility of
notifying court clerk that presentence investigation report
should be made part of the record on appeal).

Under such

circumstances, this Court must presume the correctness of the
disposition below.
App. 1992).

State v. Rawlinqs, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah

This presumption includes the trial court's

consideration of both defendant's rehabilitative needs and his
criminal history, typically included within the presentence
investigation report.
In any event, even considering defendant's rehabilitative
needs and his criminal history, the court retained the discretion
to send defendant to prison rather than to follow the
recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole.

See State v. Houk,

906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)(trial court not bound by AP&P
recommendations); State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah
1957) (''Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no
matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may be
able to demonstrate to the trial judge").

Rather, "the court is

empoweired to place the defendant on probation if it thinks that
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will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the
public interest."

State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah

App. 1991)(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court knew not only that defendant had been
convicted of possession of methamphetamine, but also that he had
in his possession a quantity of baggies consistent with
distribution of the drug.

See R. 9, R. 43: 6; State v. Lipsky,

639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1981) (sentencing court may rely on
information from varied sources).

With undisputed information

before it, the trial court determined that imposing a prison term
represented a more just disposition than probation.

See, e.g..

State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (no abuse of
discretion where trial court emphasized punishing defendant
rather than rehabilitating him); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115,
117-19 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally
give considerable weight to circumstances of crime).

Such a

disposition is well within the discretion of a sentencing court.
On appeal, this Court should exercise great restraint in
overturning the trial court's determination.

The trial court was

in the most advantaged position to make the highly
individualistic assessment required to fashion a just sentence.
See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) (sentencing
"necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court"
(quotations and citation omitted)).

Certainly, the sentencing

court's assessment of defendant's character may have been based
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at least partially on its personal observation of defendant's
body language, demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which are
reflected in the record on appeal.

See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

932, 939 (Utah 1994).
In this case, the trial court evaluated the evidence,
exercised its discretion within the bounds of the law, and
imposed a proper statutory penalty for the offense to which
defendant entered his plea.

Because it cannot be said that "no

reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court," the court did not abuse its discretion.

Gerrard, 584

P.2d at 887.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for one count of possession of a controlled substance,
a third degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \0

day of June, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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